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Reciprocal Dealing '
The practice of reciprocal dealing-buying from one's customers-
has only recently come under direct judicial attack.' Before 1965 only
the Federal Trade Commission had concerned itself with reciprocity,
and the Commission had characterized it as an unfair trade practice
in only three cases. 2 Then, in FTC v. Consolidated Foods, the Supreme
Court adopted the Commission's view that reciprocity was indeed
"one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the anti-
trust laws are aimed" and, accordingly, disallowed a merger because
it posed a threat of reciprocal dealing.3 The Court held that the ac-
quisition by Consolidated Foods, a food processor, wholesaler and
retailer, of Gentry, Inc., a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and
garlic, violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.4 Competition would be
substantially lessened, the Court felt, because the merged firms could
now exercise the "mixed threat and lure of reciprocal buying" by
inducing food processors that sold to Consolidated to buy from
Gentry.a Gentry, the Court said, would thus be given an unfair com-
petitive advantage. Its competitors would be foreclosed from a sub-
stantial part of the dehydrated onion and garlic market, not because
Gentry would offer a lower price or better service, but because of
* Originally prepared for the Senior Studies Program, Yale Law School.
1. As recently as 1953 a United States District Court termed reciprocal dealing a
"natural and normal business practice." See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 921,
633 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
2. All three cases involved the railroads. Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931);
Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937).
The Commission branded reciprocal dealing an unfair trade practice illegal under § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
3. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965), rev'g, 329 F.2d 623
(7th Cir. 1964), rev'g, [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. Rar,. 16,182, at 20,972
(FTC 1962). Reciprocal dealing had been tangentially relevant in three previous lower
court decisions. In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235
(N.D. IIl. 1954), rev'd, 353 U.S. 586 (1957), the Government charged that du Pont had
used its stock ownership in General Motors to promote reciprocal sales from du Pont
to suppliers of General Motors. The district court's dismissal of the Government's com-
plaint was reversed by the Supreme Court, but the Court did not pass judgment on the
reciprocity allegation. United States v. National City Lines, Inc. 186 F.2d 5062 (7th Cir.
1951), treated as a conspiracy-to-monopolize case, included an example of the use of
reciprocity. Firestone, Standard and other producers purchased preferred stock of bits
companies under an agreement whereby the bus lines were obligated to purchase their
petroleum and tire requirements from the financing producers. Increased use of rec-
iprocity was cited as one of several reasons for condemning a merger under section
7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320
F.2d 509, 524 (3d Cir. 1963).
4. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
5. 380 U.S. at 592.
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Consolidated's position as a customer of Gentry's customers., Red-
procity, said the Court, would inject an "irrelevant and alien factor"
into the competitive process.7
Though there was evidence that Consolidated had actually sought
to implement a policy of reciprocal dealing, the Court felt that Gentry
would obtain an unfair advantage as a result of the merger even if
it had not actively pursued that policy. The Court's opinion quoted
with approval the Commission's findings that ". . . merely as a result
of its connection with Consolidated and without any action on the
latter's part, Gentry would have an unfair advantage over competitors
enabling it to make sales that otherwise might not have been made.""
This suggests that "lure" is enough-even potential reciprocity may
ban an acquisition.9 Since conglomerate mergers are becoming increas-
ingly common,'0 it is particularly important to understand the Court's
attitude toward reciprocity and its underlying economic theory."
6. Id. at 594.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 597. Apparently neither the carrot nor the stick was of much help to Con-
solidated. Just before the merger in 1951, Gentry held 28 per cent of the dehydrated
onion market and 51 per cent of the dehydrated garlic market. Its chief competitor,
Basic Vegetables, held 60 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. Seven years after the
merger, in 1938, Gentry's percentages were 35 per cent in onions and 39 per cent in
garlic, while Basic's were 57 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. During this period
the industry output had doubled and Gentry's total share had increased from 32 to 35
per cent. The Court did not consider Gentry's post-acquisition losses in garlic sales
significant; but for the "threat and lure" of reciprocity, Gentry's performance might
have been even worse.
9. This "lure" theory of reciprocal dealing will be tested in United States v. General
Motors Corp., 5 TRADE REG. RE. 45,053 (Case 1733) (NJ). Ill., Docket Div. 63C80,
filed Jan. 14, 1963). In its complaint the Government has alleged that because of Gen-
eral Motors' substantial purchases of transportation service, it has been able to monopo-
lize the market for the sale of locomotives.
10. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Acquisitions and Dissolutions of Manufacturing
Facilities 1959-62, Annual Survey of Manufacturers (1962); FTC News Release, Feb. 11,
1966.
11. Judicial reaction to Consolidated has been mixed. In United States v. Penick &
Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965). the district court denied the Government's
request for a preliminary injunction enjoining a proposed acquisition by Reynolds To-
bacco Co. of Penick, a producer of starch and other corn derivatives. The Government
argued that reciprocity would be increased by the proposed merger because starch is the
major ingredient for adhesives used in the corrugated box and pager industries from
which Reynolds makes substantial purchases. It alleged the existence of reciprocal trad-
ing in the cigarette industry and the substantial purchasing power of Re)molds, and
urged the court to apply Consolidated. The court concluded that, although possible, it
was not a reasonable probability that reciprocity would result from the merger.
The second court to consider the application of Consolidated was noticeably more
sympathetic. In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. l96),
the district court held an acquisition by General Dynamics of Liquid Carbonic Corp.,
then the largest domestic producer of carbon dioxide, to be illegal under section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
The academic treatment of reciprocal dealing has also been mixed. Cf. Ferguson,
Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAi' & Co.xmsp. Pnon.
552, 579 (1965) (advocating that there be no antitrust policing of reciprocity); Handler,
Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L.
1021
The Yale Law Journal
The emerging law of reciprocity, like that of tie-ins, requirements
contracts, and exclusive dealing arrangements, is most easily under-
stood as a concern with foreclosure of competitors from a market. But
as the courts have said over and over again, the anti-trust laws are
meant to protect competition, not inefficient competitors.1 " Fore-
closure of competitors is economically desirable if achieved only by
producing and selling at a lower price. Reciprocal dealing is not an
anticompetitive device merely because it may have the effect of injur-
ing competitors but only if it results in restrictions of output or
barriers to entry.
The Rationale of the Courts
The courts, the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice have established an irrebuttable presumption that a certain
group of business practices, of which reciprocity is the newest mem-
ber, can be used to create additional monopoly power.18 This theory
claims that the acquired company can be levered into a monopoly
selling position by means of the buying power of the acquiring com-
pany. The conglomerate firm is supposed to be able to exert its full
buying power on its suppliers, and at the same time to transfer some
of this power to its selling subsidiary by forcing these same suppliers
to buy from it. Although some commentators have demonstrated the
economic impossibility of this bootstrapping in other contexts, the
courts and the commission have been oblivious of their work.14 Per-
Rrv. 433 (1963) (urging a rule prohibiting only coercive reciprocal dealing); Harsha,
The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity-Condemned by Conjecture?, 9 ANTITRuST BULL.
201, 211 (1964) (calling for a "rule of reason'); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1387 (1965) (advocating a strict anti-
trust rule).
12. The Court said this even in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 291 (1962).
13. This theory of leverage has played a central role in the development of antitrust
rules regulating the use of vertical arrangements, either in the form of vertical Integra-
tion or exclusive dealing contracts. Regulation of requirements and output contracts
proceeds on the notion that a firm producing a certain percentage of the output in a
particular market can sign up as exclusive retailers a greater percentage of the "avail.
able" outlets for the product than this market share would require and then, from this
entrenched position, "lever" an increased share of the market. Bork & Bowman, The
Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138, reprinted in 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 587, 591
(1964).
But it is in the area of tie-in contracts that the theory of market leverage has had its
clearest formulation and most profound effect. The assumption that tie-in contracts
can be used to exercise market leverage is the foundation for the rule that tie-In con-
tracts are "quasi per se" illegal. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6
(1958) (tie-in contracts "are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has suffi-
cient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition ... ."). Even before Consolidated, the Court believed that purchasing power
could be used as a fulcrum for market leverage. See United States v. Griffith, 834 U.s. 100,
105 (1958).
14. See, e.g., Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138,
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haps it is worth another try, this time in the setting of reciprocal
dealing.
A competitive buyer which has no purchasing power will not be
able to practice reciprocity at all. Reciprocity would impose an extra
cost on the firm's suppliers-at the very least the cost of making their
purchases from a designated source instead of having full freedom of
choice. If the buyer lacks market power, there is no reason why sup-
pliers would put up with this extra cost. Rather, they would sell their
wares to other purchasers at the going market price1 5
In Consolidated the Court felt that the buying half of Consolidated-
Gentry did in fact have market power, and it built its decision on the
theory of market leverage. In this context market leverage is said to
be the use of purchasing power to create market power in sales.1 But
economic analysis shows that once a firm has fully exploited its market
power in purchasing, it cannot use that power to gain additional profits
elsewhere.
Firms with purchasing (monopsony) power maximize profits in a
way comparable to those with selling (monopoly) power. The monop-
reprinted in 9 AiNrsmus-r Burl- 587 (1964); Bork, The Place of Antitrust Among National
Goals, Basic Antitrust Questions in the Middle Sixties, Transcript of the Fifth Conference
on Antitrust Issues of the National Industrial Conference Board, Mar. 3, 1966; Bowman,
Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE UJ. 19 (1957); Director & Levi,
Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 281 (1956).
15. If Consolidated's suppliers for one reason or another prefer Gentry's competitors,
they will not now switch to Gentry unless Consolidated bribes them to do so by paying
them more when it purchases from them-if it does not, they will simply sell to others
who will pay $1 per unit with no strings attached. It will never be worthwhile for
Consolidated to pay its suppliers to buy from Gentry, for by doing so it will always
lose at least as much as it will gain. If Consolidated had to pay, say, an extra $.03 per
unit to induce its suppliers to buy from Gentry, its gain on Gentry sales could at best
recoup the $.03 it expended. If more than a $.03 profit could be made, Gentry's products
could have been profitably sold in the first place simply by lowering the price by $.03.
Of course, if Gentry were able to sell all it could produce at the going price, It would
have no incentive to offer a price cut-but in that event there would also be no reason
for Consolidated to insist that its suppliers buy reciprocally from it.
When a supplier does buy an undifferentiated product from its customers, it may
be doing so simply as a courtesy to them. The result is simply a reallocation, without
change in market shares, among the firms in the competitive industry selling the un-
differentiated product-that is, some of them will begin selling to different suppliers.
16. What the critics of conglomerate integration overlook or ignore is the fact that
if Consolidated has market power, its business is valuable to the purchasers of dehy-
drated spices not because it makes these spices but simply because it is a purchaser of
substantial size. This would suggest that as far as the suppliers are concerned, the business
of one of Consolidated's large competitors would be equally attractive. Why then is
it any less plausible or less economical for, say, Basic Vegetable, Gentry's primary com-
petitor, to contract for the business of a competitor of Consolidated than for Gentry to
"buy" the business of Consolidated after a merger. In either case the true costs involve
the foregone return to a particular seller. This is the opportunity cost of not doing busi-
ness with a supplier. The business is either worth paying for or it is not; and this cost
is either less than the cost of a direct price cut by the spice sellers or it is not. The
corporate connection of the participants is irrelevant except in terms of the effciency
of internal exchanges as contrasted to market transactions.
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olist can control its selling price by restricting output, while the
monopsonist can control the price it pays by restricting its purchases.
The absolute size of the monopsonist's purchases affects the unit price
he will have to pay-the more he wants, the higher the price. Thus
before the monopsonist will buy an extra unit, he must reckon as part
of its cost the increased price he has to pay on all other units he pur-
chases. His profits will be highest if he continues to purchase units
until the total cost of the last unit purchased, including this premium
on all other units, just balances the addition to his revenue which the
last unit will bring him.
17
If the monopsonist has reached this profit-maximizing point, he will
have no incentive to promote reciprocal dealing.18 For reciprocal deal-
ing, by imposing extra costs on suppliers, has the same effect as a
demand for a lower price by the monopsonist acting solely as a buyer.
In both cases, suppliers will only be willing to sell at that lower price
a smaller quantity than that which the monopsonist should buy in
order to maximize his profits. 19 Thus reciprocity cannot be used to
lever or create new market power because its use reduces the profit-
ability of monopsony power which already exists.
There is, of course, one sense in which a monopolist or monopsonist
can "shift" his market power to another market. But this "transfer"
of power is just that-a loss in one market for a gain in another-not,
as the Court's theory presupposes, a simultaneous retention and expan-
sion of market power. Thus Consolidated could induce its suppliers
to buy from Gentry, but their price to Consolidated would go up; in
17. For a discussion of how a monopsonist maximizes his profits see Lrrvwici, Tiza
PRICE SYSTE AND RESOURCE RELOCATION 278-88 (3d ed. 1966).
18. If for one reason or another a firm is not free to price at the maximizing point
on its demand curve, it may be able to use reciprocal dealing to increase profits. See
p. 1026-29 infra.
19. The effect of varying this price is to reduce the net revenues generated from the
use of the factor. The total scheme will be unprofitable, as these losses will always be
at least equal and usually greater than any profit made on the reciprocal sales. This is
because the extra costs imposed on suppliers by reciprocal dealing can never be com-
pletely recouped by the monopsonist in the form of profits. For example, suppose that
Consolidated's suppliers had no use, or only limited use for Gentry's dehydrated herbs,
yet were forced by Consolidated to purchase them anyway. The cost imposed on these
suppliers would then equal the difference between the sales price of the spices and their
zero or limited value to the suppliers. Assume further that the suppliers were just willing
to sell 10 units to Consolidated at the price of $1 per unit. If Consolidated conditions its
purchase of 10 units on the reciprocal sales of, say, 50 units of Gentry produce at
$.05 per unit, and if this $2.50 is a complete loss to the suppliers, they will have to
charge Consolidated $1.25 per unit for the 10 units they sell to Consolidated, If the
profits to Consolidated through its Gentry sales are greater than the cost to the suppliers,
it could have had Gentry sell its products at a price below its competitors' and would
have been better off gaining additional sales through this price cut than through
reciprocity.
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effect, Consolidated would be paying the suppliers to buy Gentry's
products. Nevertheless, it might conceivably choose to do this in order
to force Gentry's competitors out of business and thus secure a new
monopoly. But even if it were worthwhile for Consolidated to take a
short-term loss in order to secure a monopoly position for Gentry, -0
this squeeze could be accomplished by any firm with a deep pocket-
whether or not it had market power, and whether or not it used
reciprocal dealing.
21
Reciprocal dealing, then, would seem to be impossible for firms
without market power and unprofitable for firms with market power.
Yet the prevalence of "trade departments" to deal with firms which
a conglomerate both sells to and buys from, indicates that the practice
is widespread. 22 It remains to be seen just what these firms gain through
reciprocity and whether these private gains are offset by social losses-
that is whether or not reciprocity is in fact an anti-competitive trade
practice.
Reciprocity can be used to increase profits, not by creating new
market power, but by enabling the reciprocal dealer to capture all
the profits from a position already held. In this maximizing process,
reciprocity usually performs the function of an indirect price cut.
Price cuts, whether direct or indirect, are certainly not "irrelevant
and alien" factors in a market but rather are crucial transmissions in
the "central nervous system of the economy."2'
The situations in which reciprocity can be used to increase profits
have one thing in common: they all involve some obstacle to com-
plete freedom in pricing. This barrier may result from governmental
regulation, a private cartel, or simply the anticipated reaction of
participants in the market (price leadership). These uses of reciprocity
20. Some commentators have questioned whether such "predatory" practices can ever
be worthwhile. See, e.g., McGee, Price Discrimination and Competitive Effects: The Stan-
dard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. Cm. L. PRv. 398, 398-405 (1956).
21. In fact a conglomerate that buys from its customers usually has less incentive to
try to drive out its competitors from the level on which it does not have market power
than does a conglomerate in totally different industries. To the extent that a conglomerate
with purchasing power ultimately buys back its own products, it will not be interested
in creating market power at its selling level. Any additional profits in sales will be lost
when it buys from its suppliers at the monopoly price they pass on to it. A monopoly
profit can only be gained at one level or the other. See generally Bork, Vertical Inte-
gration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U.
Cm. L. REv. 157 (1954).
22. See, e.g., Ammer, Realistic Reciprocity, 40 HAnv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb., 1962, at
116; Hausman, Reciprocal Dealin& and the Antitrust Laws, 77 Hav. L. REv. 873 (1964);
Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U. Cm. 73,
75-77 (1957).
23. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 229 n.59 (1940).
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can serve both parties to a transaction, whether they be large buyers,
small buyers, large sellers or small sellers.
Evasion of Minimum Price Restrictions
Reciprocal dealing is particularly useful for evasion of minimum
price restrictions since the apparent price paid for the regulated com-
modity remains above the legal floor. The seller can charge the mini-
mum allowed price and then purchase from his customers instead of
from his usual sources of supply.24 The substitute for the lower price
to the buyer of the regulated commodity is increased sales, perhaps
even at an inflated price.
25
Whether or not a regulated firm should be allowed to reduce its
price by means of reciprocal business is a question properly tested by
the rules of the regulatory commission, not by the Sherman or the
Clayton Act. Since the minimum rate rules are just the sort of rules
that would be per se illegal under the anti-trust laws were they set by
a private cartel, it is difficult to see how these rules should weigh in
an anti-trust case. Their evasion will in most cases promote those
same policies which the anti-trust laws are designed to promote.
20
Reciprocal dealing may also be used as a form of secret price cut
by a firm in an oligopolistic industry which wants to steal a share of
the market from its competitors without provoking retaliatory price
24. Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931) and Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67
(1932) provide examples of the use of reciprocal dealing to secure price rebates in the
sale of transportation services. Both involved meat companies selling equipment to
railroads favored in the routing of their meat shipments. Both cases had another common
element. The sales of railroad equipment were made by related companies the stock of
which was owned personally by the officials of the meat companies.
25. Assume, for example, that the Interstate Commerce Commission fixes the lowest
rate a railroad can charge at $10 per unit of transportation. At this rate, the railroad
finds that it is operating at 50 per cent of capacity. The railroad would like to attract
more orders because the cost to it of providing more transportation service on already
existing runs is well below the fixed rate. In order to sell more transportation, the
railroad must take away business from competitors by lowering its price below $10 per
unit. If the ICC will not allow the railroad to reduce its rate directly, the railroad has
an incentive to accomplish the price cut indirectly. One way to lower the price is to
purchase the prodcts of its customers at prices higher than it would otherwise pay.
26. Since the price reduction results in a more efficient use of existing transportation
resources, it is to this extent pro-competitive, rather than anti-competitive.
On the other hand, those firms to which the railroad can sell at a lower price by giving
rebates in its purchases may obtain a competitive advantage in their sales to the railroad.
If General Motors, for instance, is a substantial purchaser of railroad transportation and
at the same time sells locomotives to the railroads through its electromotive division,
the railroad may be induced to buy GM's diesels even though they are not as good as
its competitors' simply because GM is able to provide a technique for evading ICC
minimum price regulations. In this sense the conglomerate's unique position may be a
happenstance that infuses "an irrelevant and alien factor" into the competitive process,
Were such reciprocal arrangements unique to GM, competitors of GM's electromotive
division might be foreclosed even though they make a better diesel. See note 8 supra.
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cuts. This use of reciprocity does indeed foreclose competitors, but
only those that continue to set prices at "oligopolistic" levels above
marginal cost. In this regard the only advantage that the conglomerate
firm has is that it can make secret price cuts. If its competitors reduced
their price to marginal cost this advantage would be lost. Movement
away from prices inflated by cartels and oligopolies obviously involves
a movement toward the desired competitive solution and should not
be prohibited.
Cost-Justified Price Cuts
The Robinson-Patman Act imposes a form of price regulation on
all suppliers to intermediate purchasers.2 7 The act may result in arti-
ficial price restraints because mere differences in price are considered
prima facie evidence of illegal discrimination.28 Although this pre-
sumption may be rebutted by proof of a cost justification, such a show-
ing may be difficult and expensive to make.209 To avoid the risk of
litigation, a firm may decide to charge a uniform price, even though
it can supply certain of its customers more cheaply than others. To
avoid losing those customers that can be supplied more cheaply, the
seller can accept reciprocal sales from those customers instead of from
its customary suppliers.
Use of reciprocal dealing to sell at cost-justified prices clearly pro-
motes competition for it allows the manufacturer to set prices closer
to his cost.
Non Cost-Justified Price Discriminations
Because reciprocal dealing eliminates the threat of arbitrage" be-
tween its customers or suppliers, a firm may use such dealing to exploit
fully its existing market power.3' In fact reciprocity is useful for con-
27. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
28. Id. § 13(b).
29. See F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRImINATION UNDER TIE ROBINSON.-PATZMAN Acr 29.-312
(1962); Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson.Patman Act, 6 STA:. L. RE'. 3, 7-14
(1953); Dam, The Economics and Law of Price Discrimination: Herein of Three Regu.
latory Schemes, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1963). See also Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC,
346 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1953).
30. "Arbitrage" is the term given to the process of trading a good which is being sold
or purchased at different prices in different markets. In the cases of price discrimination
in the sales of a commodity, it is the resale from a buyer in a lower priced market to
a buyer in a higher priced market. In the case of price discrimination in the purchase
of a commodity, it is the sale from a lower priced seller to a higher priced seller for
resale to the buyer. The effect of arbitrage is to render impossible the use of varying
prices.
31. J. ROBINsoN, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPEF.Ear COMPETIMON 224 (1933). For the expla-
nation of the parallel case of the use of the tie-in contract as a means of price discrim-
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ducting price discrimination successfully in purchases as well as in
sales. 32 The monopsony buyer can discriminate in its purchases if its
suppliers have differing elasticities of supply,3 3 while the monopoly
seller can discriminate in sales if its buyers have differing elasticities
of demand.3 4 For either to be successful, the firms which are paid or
charged different prices for the same product must be kept separate
from each other; arbitrage between sellers or buyers must be pre-
vented.35 Thus reciprocal dealing on the buying side does for a monop-
sonistic buyer just what it does for a monopolistic seller. It maximizes
the return of those who are able to utilize it for purposes of price
discrimination.88
ination, see Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YAU L.J,
19, 28 (1937).
32. Regular counting devices for determining rentals and tie-in contracts for sales
can also be used for the same purpose.
33. Elasticity of supply refers to the slope of the supply curve. At any point on
the supply curve, it measures the ratio between the change in quantity supplied and
the corresponding change in price offered.
34. Elasticity of demand is the counterpart of elasticity of supply. It measures at any
point on the demand curve the ratio between the change in quantity purchased and
the corresponding change in price charged.
35. See note 24 supra. Unless the markets can be segregated, the customers (suppliers)
who are paying more (getting less) will buy from (sell to) the customers (suppllers) who
are paying less (getting more) rather than from the monopolist (monopsonist) that Is
trying to sell to (buy from) each of them at different prices.
The monopoly seller can successfully discriminate through reciprocity by charging
the highest possible price to all buyers and then lowering it to those who would refuse
to pay it-those with more elastic demands-by accepting reciprocal sales from them
at inflated prices. For example, suppose the monopolist could sell to buyer X at $5
per unit and to buyer Y at $15 per unit. If this price differential were paid directly,
firm Y would soon be buying from X rather than from the monopolist. If instead the
monopolist charges both $15 per unit, and then buys enough from X so as to in effect
give him a $10 per unit rebate, he can obtain maximum profits and eliminate arbitrage,
The use of reciprocal dealing by a discriminating monopsonist is the exact counterpart
of its use by the monopolist where the discrimination is in the price paid for a product
rather than in the price received for it. Assume a monopsonist, A, that can buy from
firm X at $5 per unit and from Y at $15per unit. If this differential were paid directly,
firm X would sell to Y rather than to If instead, A pays both firms $15 per unit
and conditions purchases from X on X's acceptance of reciprocal sales from 4 at a
price gauged effectively to reduce the purchase price from X to $5 per unit, the monop.
sonist maximizes return and curtails arbitrage.
36. ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 189-90.
Reciprocity may also enable the monopolistic seller or the monopsonistic purchaser to
practice what is known as "perfect price discrimination" or multi-part pricing. Tills is
the process of not only separating each supplier or buyer into a separate "market" for
pricing purposes but also discriminating in the price paid to each seller or charged to each
buyer for each unit. In its simplest form, perfect price discrimination is achieved If each
unit of a product is purchased at its minimum supply price or sold at its maximum
sales price. The market power necessary to conduct perfect price discrimination success-
fully is very great; probably the only firms capable of doing so are the single buyer and
seller.
Perfect price discrimination is conducted by means of the "all or nothing" offer. For
the monopsonist, the all or nothing offer puts to sellers the choice of accepting the
monopsonist's offer to purchase stated amounts at stated prices or not selling to the mo-
nopsonist at all. As used by the monopolist, the choice put to buyers is to purchase tie
product in stated amounts at stated prices or not to purchase at all. Again reciprocal
dealing is used to avoid arbitrage.
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The net effect on output resulting from the use of price discrimina-
tion, whether in sales or purchases, will depend on the relative sensi-
tivity of sales to price change in the higher and lower priced markets
and on the relative size of these markets. If the manufacturer sells at
two prices and is forced to adopt a single price, output may be ex-
panded or contracted. Discrimination is not necessarily output restrict-
ing37 Only if most of the monopoly revenue is obtained from large
sales in the lower price market would the elimination of price dis-
crimination lead to lower average price. Even after careful analysis
the predicted output effect can represent no more than an informed
guess. It has been persuasively argued that this uncertainty, together
with extraordinary difficulties and costs in trying to discover and ban
instances of price discrimination, make the endeavor to do so a waste-
ful, if not futile, one.38 Thus even in this most suspect of all its uses-
that of fully exploiting existing market power-reciprocal dealing
should probably be permitted.30
Yet the judicial treatment of reciprocal dealing suggests just the
opposite result-that it is destined for per se illegality under the heavy
hand of the market leverage theory. This single-minded concept is
based on a misconception of the purposes for which reciprocal dealing
may be utilized. Given the present state of economic knowledge, these
uses suggest that a rule of per se legality, not illegality, should govern
the practice of reciprocal dealing.
JOHN PATRICK ANDMRONt
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